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ABSTRACT:  Child labor is a serious problem throughout the world, especially in 
developing countries.  Millions of working children are subjected to extreme exploitation 
in terms of toiling for long hours for minimal pay under harsh conditions. This paper first 
puts the issue of child labor into its historical context, tracing its course from the first 
recognition of the practice as a social and moral problem in the 19th century to the 
present-day international effort to curb child labor, headed by the International Labor 
organization. The underlying economic causes of child labor are examined as are its 
pernicious effects on children and society from both a societal and economic standpoint. 
Economic arguments in support of child labor are also addressed and, finally, 
international efforts to curb the practice of child labor through the creation of an 
international legal apparatus to tackle the problem and also through efforts to remedy the 
underlying economic conditions that lead to child labor. 
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I.  Introduction 
  
Child labor is a serious problem throughout the world, especially in developing 
countries.  Millions of working children are subjected to extreme exploitation in terms of 
toiling for long hours for minimal pay under harsh conditions.  While the child labor 
issue is a complex one, without any easy solutions, this paper seeks to address the nature 
of the problem and what efforts are done about it.  
 Part II looks at the historical developments of child labor at the national and 
international levels.  Part III provides an overview of the current child labor situation and 
the reasons why child labor remains pervasive in the world today.  Part IV examines the 
measures presently is use to curb child labor.  Finally, Part V highlights proposals for 
reducing the use of child labor.         
 
II.  History 
 
Child labor was, at the international and national levels, one of the first fields in 
respect to human rights which regulations were adopted.  Premised on the notion of 
protection of the weakest, these regulations aimed at eliminating the very serious abuses 
to which child labor had given rise at the beginning of the industrial era.  This concern for 
the protection of children against poor work conditions that shocked public opinion had 
been at the origin of the whole concept of labor law, international as well as national.  
The fact that children of five or six years of age were employed in spinning mills had 
been one of the main reasons which promoted the first campaigns in favor of 
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international action in the field of labor law.  Over the years, there has been considerable 
effort to protect children at both national and international levels.   
A.  Domestic Efforts 
 At the national level, the first labor laws concerning children were those adopted 
in England in the 19th century and the French law of 1841, which fixed at 8 years the 
minimum age of admission to industrial work (rising to 12 in 1874 and 13 in 1892).1  
Private industries also attempted to reform child labor standards.  For example, as early 
as 1850, in Belgium, textile manufacturers and mine managers decided among 
themselves to prohibit the use of child labor in their own plants.2   However, without laws 
to force their competitors to observe the same prohibitions, the reformers could not afford 
to maintain their new standards.  These reformers did not want their good will rendered 
worthless by a minority of self-interested manufacturers who ignored the new minimum 
age, and hired children for the savings in wage costs.3 
 At the same time, in the United States, reformers were fighting their own 
campaign against child labor.  After the Civil War, industry created manufacturing jobs 
for many poor farmers in the American South, and sometimes for their children.  
Businessmen in the South competed with the North in much the same way as developing 
countries compete with developed nations in the 20th century: by exploiting cheap labor.  
Lewis Parker, a South Carolina cotton mill owner, when testifying before the U.S. House 
of Representatives Committee on Labor in 1914, said that “[W]e cannot possibly 
gravitate from a condition of agriculturalism to a condition of industrialism without the 
                                                            
1 CLARK NARDINELLI, CHIILD LABOR AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 127 (1990). 
2 Id. at 128. 
3 Id.  
 3
employment of minors.”4  Northern businesses complained that the South had an unfair 
advantage, and that Southern manufacturers should copy the North’s progressive child 
labor prohibitions.  But the South refused.  Cotton mill owners thought of themselves as 
benevolent for employing children as young as eight years old who contributed their 
meager wages to their otherwise destitute families.5   
 Financial self-interest might have motivated employers to resist child labor reform 
indefinitely had the reform campaign not been strengthened by public outrage.  The press 
began to expose the conditions of children in the workplace.6  Citizen action committees, 
such as the National Child Labor Committee, began lobbying the government for reforms 
in child labor.  The early federal bans won by these reformers were declared 
unconstitutional.  In Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional the Child Labor Law of 1916 which attempted to regulate child labor by 
prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of products made by children.7  
  After the Hammer decision, the reformers changed tactics.  They pushed for a 
constitutional amendment that would have given Congress the power to set a minimum 
age for employment.8  The Congress adopted an amendment in 1924.9  However, the 
amendment was successfully opposed in twenty-two states.10  It was not until 1938, with 
adoption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, that the United States banned the use of child 
                                                            
4 WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 125 (1970). 
5 Id. at 39. 
6 VERNA PESEUER CURTIS, PHOTOGRAPHY AND REFORM: LEWIS HINE AND THE 
NATIONAL CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (1984). 
7 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 255 (1918). 
8 Trattner, supra note 4 at 164.  
9 Id. at 167.  The House approved the amendment by a vote of 297 to 69.  The Senate approved the 
amendment by a vote of 61 to 23. 
10 Id. at 184. 
 4
labor altogether.11   While the ban still suffers from serious enforcement problems, the 
widespread use of child labor in the United States has been effectively eradicated.  
B.  Early International Efforts 
 While reformers in various nations called for minimum age standards and other 
worker protections within their own countries, citizens of many nations began calling for 
standards on the international level.  Popular pressure for workplace safety and other 
worker rights grew following World War I.  Workers were organizing into trade unions 
and demanding greater rights.   
 In 1919, as part of the peace treaties that ended World War I, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) was created, providing for universal application of worker 
standards and tripartite participation by workers, government, and employers in the 
legislative process.12 The primary motivation for the creation of the ILO was economic.  
Because of its inevitable effect on production costs, any industry or country adopting 
social reform would find itself at a disadvantage in relation to its competitors.13  The 
Preamble to the ILO Constitution states that “the failure of any nation to adopt humane 
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve 
the conditions in their own countries.”14  The second motivation was humanitarian.  The 
condition of workers, more and more numerous and exploited with no consideration for 
their health, their family lives and the advancement was less and less acceptable.14  The 
third motivation was political.  Without an improvement in their condition, the workers, 
                                                            
11 Id. at 204.  The Fair Labor Standards Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100 (1940), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251 (1918).  The Act defined child labor 
as the employment of children under sixteen, or the employment of children under sixteen in occupations 
designated as hazardous by the Children’s Bureau.  Trattner, supra note 4 at 204. 
12 HECTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: THE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1996). 
13 Id. at 24. 
14 ILO, Constitution of the International Labour Organization and Standing Orders of the International 
Labour Conference, the Preamble (1989). 
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whose numbers were ever increasing as a result of industrialization, would create social 
unrest, and possibly revolt.15  
 The ILO is the most important international organization dealing with the issue of 
worker rights, including those of children.  Its activities include setting international 
standards through the promulgation of Conventions16 and Recommendations;17 
monitoring the implementation of those standards; and providing technical assistance, 
information and aid to its member States.18  The ILO, through its standard-setting 
activities, has created a comprehensive international labor code, an unprecedented 
achievement for an international organization.  
The real strength of the ILO is its unique tripartite structure.19  In all of the ILO’s 
activities, the most comprehensive employers’ organization, the most representative 
workers’ organization, and the government of each state participate equally.20  Worker 
and employer involvement provide alternate sources of information to government 
statistics, force governments to be honest on the information they provide, make the ILO 
more accountable, and counterbalance the political motives that governments bring to any 
international body.21  
                                                            
15 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 25. 
16 Conventions are comparable to multilateral international treaties.  Once they are ratified by member 
states, they create binding obligations.  Once ratified member states are expected to pass necessary laws to 
implement the convention.  The government of each ratifying state is expected to report regularly on the 
implementation on the convention.  States are not permitted to ratify a Convention with reservations.  They 
must either accept or reject it as written.  N. Valticos & G. von Potobsky, International Labour Law 50 
(1995). 
17 The recommendation serves as a guideline for the states.  Member states are expected to submit the texts 
of the recommendation to their legislative bodies for adoption, and report to the governing body of the ILO 
regarding progress with respect to implementation of the recommendation.  There are, however, no 
substantive obligation required.  Id. at 52. 
18 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 12-14. 
19 Id. at 10.  
20 Id. at 11. 
21 Id. at 13. 
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 While the ILO is the most important body addressing the issues of child labor, it 
is not the only international body to have done so.  The United Nations has touched on 
the issue in certain instruments.  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights provides that “children and young people should be protected from 
economic and social exploitation.  Their employment in work harmful to their morals or 
health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal development should be 
punishable by law.  States should also set age limits below which paid employment of 
child labor should be punishable by law.”22  The Covenant has been ratified by 135 
States.23  
The United Nations also adopted in 1959 the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child, the terms of which are very similar to the 1919 Constitutional provisions of the 
ILO.24  This Declaration affirms in particular that a child shall not be admitted to 
employment before an appropriate minimum age and that it “shall in no case be caused or 
permitted to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health 
or education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development.”25  In 1979, the 
International Year of the Child, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
appointed a group to draft the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  The aim of the 
Convention was to establish more comprehensive protection for children by holding 
society legally accountable for such protection.26  The Convention was adopted in 1989, 
                                                            
22 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 933 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3 1976. 
23 Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights: Classification and status of 
ratifications as on 1 January 2006 90, Vol. 18 No. 1-4 (2006).  There are no reservations regarding the child 
employment provisions.  
24 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 1386 (XIV), U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. 
Doc. A/4354. 
25 Id.  
26 Gursharan Varandani, Child Labour and Women Workers 66 (1994).  
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and incorporated most of the rights of children into one comprehensive international law.  
These guaranteed rights include “civil-political, economic-social-cultural, and 
humanitarian rights.”27  The Convention creates a binding obligation on each ratifying 
country to apply its provisions through legislation and then to report regularly on its 
application. The Convention has been ratified by 189 nations.28  Only the United States 
and Somalia have not ratified the Convention.29     
 
III.  Child Labor in the World Today 
 
A.  Child Labor in Statistics 
Statistics on child labor are in general fragmentary and often unreliable.  Many 
governments, especially in developing countries, lack an adequate system for obtaining 
accurate data on child labor.  Furthermore, they are reluctant to document child labor 
abuses which are often illegal under their domestic legislation, violate international labor 
standards, and are perceived by many as a serious failure in their public policy.30  It is 
difficult to know the exact number of children working throughout the world, but recent 
studies by the ILO Bureau of Statistics confirms that the problem is severe.  Earlier 
estimates based on very limited statistical information from about 100 countries 
estimated that there were 73 million economically active children between the ages of 5 
and 14.31  However, in 1993-94, the ILO carried out experimental studies in Ghana, India, 
Indonesia and Senegal suggests that this figure is an underestimate.  The ILO now 
                                                            
27 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A., res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. 
Doc. A/4354 (1959).  
28 See the UN web site at http:www.un.org for a list of states that have ratified this Convention.  There were 
no reservations regarding Article 32 which deals with the employment of children.  
29 Id. at httm://www.unicef.org/crc. 
30 ILO, Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable, www.ilo.org/publish/english/90ipc.chlabour.htm. 
31 ILO Committee on Employment and Social Policy, Governing Body Document on Child Labour, 264th 
Session, November 1995, G.B. 264/ESP/1, see www.ilo.org/publish/english/90ipc/chlabour/gb.htm. 
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estimates that, in the developing countries alone, there are at least 120 million children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 who work full time, and more than twice as many if those 
who combine work with school or other non-economic activities are included.32    
Of the estimated 250 million children working, 61 percent are found in Asia, 32 
percent in Africa, and 7 percent in Latin America.33  Although Asia has the largest 
number of working children, Africa has the highest incidence with roughly 40 percent of 
children between the ages of 5 and 14 working.34  
 
Economically active children in the world (5-14 years old), by region (million) 
 
Source: Frank Hagemann, et al. Global child labour trends 2000 to 2004, International Labour Office 
                                                            
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 ILO, supra note 30.  
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B.  The Effects on the Children 
 Millions of children work under conditions that impair their full physical and 
psychological development.  The long hours that children are required to work is a 
pressing problem.  In Siaklot, an eastern Pakistani region, children under the age of 14 
often work eight to ten hours each day, six days a week.35  In some countries, up to 80 
percent of working children work seven days a week.36  The most serious disadvantage to 
children of long working hours is the inability to attend school.  The lack of educational 
opportunity is a serious disadvantage since opportunities for future employment 
increasingly depend on literacy and other skills.  For the estimated 120 million children 
working full-time, the opportunity to acquire basic reading and writing skills is not 
available because they spend all their time away from school; for these children, school is 
not an option.  Also, the education of those children that split their time between work 
and school also suffers because many of the children are too fatigued from work to learn 
properly.37   
For many children, the risks of working stem from the physical hazards specific to 
their jobs.   
                                                            
35 Matthew C. Bazzano, Child Labor: What the United States and Its Corporations Can Do to Eliminate Its 
Use, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 200, 203 (Fall 2005). 
36 ILO 2006 Press Release, Oslo Conference to Seek Global Strategy for Combating Child Labour, 
www.ilo.orgpublich/english/235press/pr/2006.25.htm. 
37 ILO, supra note 30. Studies have shown that 20 hours worked per week can negatively affect educational 
opportunities for working children.  Id.  
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Distribution of injuries/illnesses by industry and sex 
 
Source: ILO Bureau of Statistics (Geneva, 1997) 
 
For example, child labor is used in mines in many countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America.  The children work long hours, without adequate protective equipment, clothing 
and training, and are exposed to high humidity levels, extreme temperatures, and 
exposure to harmful gases and fumes.38  In Asia, child labor is common in the ceramics 
and glass factory work.  Children carry loads of molten glass taken from furnaces which 
reach temperatures of 1600 degrees Celsius.  They work long hours in rooms with poor 
lighting and little or no ventilation.  The main dangers in this industry are: exposure to 
high temperatures leading to heat stress, cataracts, and burns; injuries from flying glass 
particles; impaired hearing from loud noise; eye strain from poor lighting; and exposure 
to dust, lead and toxic fumes such as carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide.39  In the match 
and fireworks industry, children as young as 3 years of age are alleged to be working in 
unventilated rooms where they are constantly exposed to toxic substances such as 
                                                            
38 ILO, supra note 31 at 9. 
39 Id. 
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asbestos and potassium chlorate.40  Moreover, match manufacturing usually takes place 
in small village factories where the risk of fire and explosion is constantly present.  In the 
carpet industry, child workers are afflicted with spinal disorders from crouching for long 
hours. 
Because children differ biologically from adults in anatomical, physiological and 
psychological characteristics, they are at greater risk of suffering mental and physical 
problems than their adult co-workers suffer.  There is evidence that children suffer more 
readily from exposure to toxic substances.41  Also, they are much more vulnerable to 
psychological and physical abuse than are adults, and suffer more devastating 
psychological damage from living and working in an environment in which they are 
denigrated and oppressed.  
C.  The Causes of Child Labor 
 Poverty is the most important reason offered as a cause of child labor.  This 
argument contends that the desperate economic conditions in some developing countries 
force children to work to help support their families.42  Also, some writers argue that 
child labor is necessary for a developing country to compete in the global marketplace.  
They argue that industrialized countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom have, at some time in the past, utilized child labor.43  Because developing 
countries cannot keep up with more developed countries in areas such as technology, the 
use of child labor is the only way those countries can remain competitive.44   
                                                            
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 ILO, supra note 30. 
43 Id. 
44 Bazzano, supra note 35 at 201. 
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There are other considerations that weaken the argument that poverty is the cause 
of child labor.  In fact, child labor may contribute to greater levels of poverty.  First, 
studies have shown that a child’s financial contribution on many families is insignificant.  
A study by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 
found that, at least in Latin America, the percentage of a family’s income earned by 
children seldom exceeds 10 to 20 percent.45  
Second, child labor reduces the job opportunities for adults, which leads to lower 
wage rates.46  With fewer adults in the workforce, employers lower wages, and poverty 
continues.  Studies have shown that employers pay children one-half to one-third the 
amount paid to adults doing the same work.47     
Third, because working children neglect their education, they grow up without the 
essential skills to improve their economic status.  If one assumes that education leads to a 
more industrialized society, then employing children contributes to poverty because it 
prevents them from acquiring the skills which could increase their earning potential.  This 
vicious cycle continues to trap working children.   
Finally, the fact that rates of child labor vary dramatically between countries of 
similar levels of economic development illuminates the point that poverty is not, by itself 
the cause of child labor.  In China, for example, there has been little child labor in recent 
decades.  Even though extremely poor until recent years, China made a political decision 
to puts its children in school rather than in jobs.  Similarly, Kerala State, in India, the 
country most famous for abuse of child labor, has virtually abolished child labor.48  
                                                            
45 ILO, supra note 31. 
46 Department of Labor Study, By the Sweat & Toil of Children, www.dol.gov 
47 ILO, supra note 31. 
48 David True, Kerala State: A Social Justice Monitor, July/August 1995. 
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Further studies have shown that countries may be equally poor, and still have relatively 
high or low levels of child labor.49  The lesson which comes from the China and Kerala 
examples is that (arguably) child labor can only exist where it is treated as politically and 
culturally acceptable. 
One the demand side, another cause of child labor is the financial self-interest of 
employers.  Basically, employers can take advantage of children to a greater extent than 
they can adults.  It has been found that working children are unorganized, less demanding, 
more obedient, and less likely to complain about poor working conditions.50  Thus, the 
more children employed the greater the profits for the employer.  A disturbing story from 
India’s carpet industry  illuminates the extent employers will go to exploit children for 
financial gain.  It has been reported that when children suffered cuts from working on the 
looms, supervisors would grind sulfur from matches into the cut and then set the sulfur on 
fire to stop the bleeding in an effort to return the children to work sooner.51 
  Also, employers have justified their use of child labor by claiming that children 
are uniquely suited for jobs.  This is best exemplified in the carpet and gem industries on 
India.  The argument is that "nimble fingers" can produce a greater number of knots in 
the weaving of carpets and polish tiny gems.   
 
                                                            
49 ILO, supra note 30. 
50 Id. 
51 ILO, supra note 29. 
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Working children ages 5-14 by sector (%) 
 
Source: Frank Hagemann, et al. Global child labour trends 2000 to 2004, International Labour Office 
 
But, the ILO reports that its research in hazardous industries in India, including carpet-
making, glass factories, lock making and gem polishing, has shown this argument to be 
entirely false.  Even in the hand-knotting of carpets, which calls for considerable 
dexterity, an empirical study of over 2,000 weavers found that children were no more 
likely than adults to make the finest knots.52  
Child labor is also perpetuated by societal attitudes that say children should work 
to support themselves or their families.  This moralistic argument is coupled by the 
practical argument that by learning a skill at a young age, a child will learn a trade which 
will support him or her throughout life.  Regardless of whether these contentions are 
valid, they remain prevalent among certain societies.   
 
                                                            
52 Id.  The argument that children are somehow more dexterous than adults seems quite ridiculous, yet the 
“nimble finger” argument is still used by those employing children in the carpet industry. 
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Distribution of economically active children 5-14 years of age in developing 
countries, by regions and sex (1995) 
 
Source: ILO Bureau of Statistics (Geneva, 1997) 
 
In Asia, the general perception is that “children should work to develop a sense of 
responsibility and develop a career, rather then become street urchins or beggars.”53  In 
Pakistan, parents push their children to work at an early age to avoid the dangers of 
vagrancy.54  Parents think their children will be better off and do not realize they are 
almost certainly being exploited.  
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been accused 
of contributing to the use of child labor.55  They provide low-interest loans to developing 
countries, but as a condition for receiving loans, the IMF and World Bank instruct 
developing countries to promote exports and cut government spending.  Often, 
governments pressed by the IMF and World Bank reduce spending for education.  In 
recent years, however, the World Bank in particular has recognized the value of 
education and health care, and has urged governments to maintain programs in these 
                                                            
53 Department of Labor, supra note 46. 
54 Id. 
55 Veronica Brand, Third World’s Poorest Crushed by First World Debt, Houston Chronicle, November 21, 
2006. 
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areas as “investments in human capital.”56  A World Bank economist has recently stated 
that the Bank’s structural adjustment programs may have increased the incidence of child 
labor in a few countries, but he argues that these countries would have been worse off if 
they have not followed Bank advice.57  However, the World Bank has also encouraged 
governments to charge students for attending school, or for books and supplies – a so-
called “cost recovery” approach.  In Zimbabwe, the structural adjustment program forced 
the reintroduction of school fees and charges for basic health services.58  These measures 
are linked by independent monitoring groups to decreases in school attendance.59  Even 
small fees prevent poor families from sending some or all of their children to school and 
those unable to afford school frequently are forced to work. 
 
IV.  Measures Currently In Use to Curb Child Labor 
 
A.  Customary International Law 
 International human rights law, through both custom and treaties, contain certain 
explicit and implicit prohibitions against certain forms of child labor.  International law, 
however, may be viewed as ineffective because it has a weak enforcement mechanism.60  
While from this perspective, reliance solely on international law as a means to eradicate 
child labor may seem futile, custom and treaty are integral elements to a solution to child 
labor. 
                                                            
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER AND SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASEBOOK AND 
MATERIALS 31 (1995) 
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“Custom is defined as the ‘pure law’ implicit in the interaction of states whose 
joint practices become a legal obligation over time.”61  Establishing a rule of customary 
international law requires two elements: state practice that reflects the rule and state 
belief that following the rule is legally required (opinio juris).62  However, simply 
showing that a state follows a rule does not prove that the state believes it is subject to a 
legal obligation.63  Developed states may have an implicit agreement amounting to a 
prohibition of child labor.  But, states that continue to utilize child labor may not 
recognize such a custom, or they may realize they acting improperly yet are unable to 
stop.   
No court has ever considered whether a prohibition of child labor is a customary 
international norm and it is unlikely that such a norm exists.64  While there is certainly 
practice to support the norm in the developed world, there remains a staggering amount 
of practice inconsistent with that norm in the developing world.  It is worth noting that 
attempts by the U.S. to insert child labor prohibitions into the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
were blocked by less developed countries.65   It is thus difficult to see how these countries 
would ever consider themselves bound by a rule of customary international law against 
child labor. 
While there is almost certainly not an international custom that prohibits child 
labor.  However, there may be a general principle that child labor is a violation of 
international law.  Since most child labor abuses occur in countries with domestic laws 
                                                            
61 Id. at 35. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 36. 
64 Claudia R. Brewster, Restoring Childhood: Saving the World’s Children from Toiling in Textile 
Sweatshops, 16 J.L. & Com. 191 (Spring 2006). 
65 Lance Compa & Stephen F. Diamond, Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade 64, (2005). 
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regulating ages for work, one could argue that there exists a general principle outlawing 
child labor.66  Yet, an international custom or a general principle that is not enforceable is 
of little help in the elimination of child labor in the international community.   
                                                            
66 The argument would be that since almost all countries have domestic regulations on child labor, there 
exists a general principle within the international community that child labor is wrong. 
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B.  The International Labour Organization 
1.  Minimum Age Convention No. 138 
 
 From its very inception, the ILO has advocated the regulation and eradication of 
child labor.  The primary element of the ILO’s work for the abolition of child labor has 
been its standard-setting work.67  Since 1919, the ILO has enacted a series of conventions 
and recommendations addressing the issue of child labor.  The Minimum Age (Industry) 
Convention 1919 (No. 5), was the first international instrument dealing with the 
minimum age of employment.68  This Convention, which has been ratified by 72 
countries, prohibits children under the age of 14 years from working in any public or 
private industrial employment.  Between 1920 and 1965, the ILO adopted nine additional 
Conventions dealing with the minimum age of employment in various areas of 
employment.69   
In 1973, the ILO adopted the comprehensive Minimum Age Convention of 1973 
(No. 138).70  This Convention consolidates and revises all ten of the previous minimum 
                                                            
67 Varandani, supra at 26 at 22. 
68 See Minimum Age (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 5).  This Convention and all other ILO Conventions 
can be located through the ILO database at http:ilolox.ilo. 
69 See Minimum Age (Sea) Convention 1920 (No. 7), which has been ratified by 52 States and sets the age 
for admission to maritime work at 14 years of age.  Convention No. 7 was revised by Minimum Age (Sea) 
Convention (Revised) 1936 (No. 58) which has been ratified by 51 States and raised the minimum age for 
maritime work to 15 years; Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention 1932 (No. 33) which 
has been ratified by 25 States and sets the standard of 14 years for non-industrial employment.  Convention 
No. 33 was revised by Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised) 1932 (No. 60) 
which has been ratified by 11 States and raises the minimum age to 15 years.  Minimum Age (Agriculture) 
Convention 1921 (No. 10), which has been ratified 54 States and provides that children below the age of 14 
may not work in agriculture employment except where it will not impede their school attendance.  The ILO 
has provided that for certain hazardous occupations the age of employment in higher than the general 
standard.  See, Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention 1921 (No. 15) which has been ratified 
by 67 States and provides that for trimmers and stokers aboard sea-going vessels the minimum age is 18; 
Minimum Age (Fisherman) Convention 1959 (No. 112) which has been ratified by 56 States and provides 
that the minimum age for work on fishing vessels is 18 years; Minimum Age (Underground Work) 
Convention 1965 (No. 123) which has been ratified by 42 States and provides that the minimum age for 
work in mining is 16 years. 
70 Minimum Age Convention of 1973 (No. 138) 
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age conventions.71 Convention No.138 is intended to be the definitive standard-setting 
instrument in the area of child labor.  This ideal is reflected in the Preamble to 
Convention No. 138 which reads that “the time has come to establish a general 
instrument on the subject, which would gradually replace the existing ones applicable to 
limited economic sectors, with a view to achieving the total abolition of child labor.”72  
This Convention has been ratified by sixty States as of the present date.73   
 
Minimum ages according to ILO Convention No. 138 
 
Source: Frank Hagemann, et al. Global child labour trends 2000 to 2004, International Labour Office 
                                                            
71 Id. art. 10.  Article 10(2) provides that the “coming into force of this Convention shall not close the 
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936, the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised), 
1937, the Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised), 1937, the Minimum Age 
(Fisherman) Convention, 1959, or the Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention, 1965,to further 
ratification.”  Article 10(3) provides that the “Minimum Age (Industry) Convention 1919, the Minimum 
Age (Sea) Convention, 1920, the Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention, 1921, and the Minimum Age 
(Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 1921, shall be closed to further ratification when all parties thereto 
have consented to such closing by ratification of this Convention or by a declaration communicated to the 
Director-General of the International Labour Office.”  Article 10(5) provides that “acceptance of the 
obligations of this Convention – (a) shall involve the denunciation of the Minimum Age (industry) 
Convention, 1919, in accordance with Article 12 thereof, (b) in respect of agriculture shall involve the 
denunciation of the Minimum Age (agriculture) Convention, 1921, in accordance with Article 9 thereof, (c) 
in respect of maritime employment shall involve the denunciation of the Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 
1920, in accordance with Article 10 thereof, and the Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 
1921, in accordance with Article 12 thereof, if and when this Convention shall have come into force.” Id. 
art. 10(5).       
72 Supra note 72, Preamble. 
73 A list of the ratifying States can be found at http://ilolex.ilo/ch:1567/public/50normes/ilolex.pqconv.pl. 
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Convention No. 138 provides States that ratify it are expected to pursue a 
“national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and to raise 
progressively the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a level 
consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons.”74  
Ratifying States are required to “specify a minimum age for admission to employment or 
work within its territory, and on means of transport registered in its territory.”75  The 
minimum age must not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling, and 
in any case, cannot be less than fifteen years76 -- or fourteen years for States “whose 
economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed.”77  Also, eighteen years 
is the minimum age for any type of employment which is “likely to jeopardize the health, 
safety or morals of young persons.”78   
Articles 4, 5 and 6 allow for ratifying States to limit the scope of application of 
the Convention.  Under Article 4, a ratifying State may exclude certain specific 
categories of employment from the application of this Convention provided they meet 
certain procedural requirements.79  Furthermore, Article 5(1) allows States “whose 
economy and administrative facilities are insufficiently developed to limit the 
                                                            
74 Id. art. 1. 
75 Id. art 2(1). 
76 Id. art. 2(3). 
77 Id. art. 2(4).  
78 Id. art. 3(1).  The types of work which art. 3(1) applies is to be determined by national laws after 
consulting employer and worker organizations if they exist.  National laws can authorize employment from 
the age of 16 years on condition that the health, safety and morals of the young persons are fully protected 
and that the young persons have received adequate instruction or training in the specific area of work. See 
art. 3(2)-(3). 
79 Id. art. 4(1).  Ratifying States must submit in its application of the Convention any categories which may 
have been excluded, give the reasons for such exclusion, and state in subsequent reports its law in respect 
to those categories. Art. 4(2)-(3).  
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Convention’s application.”80  This provision seems to allow developing States a broader 
range of excludable categories.  Both Articles 4 and 5 seem to provide some flexibility 
for the ratifying State to limit the application of the Convention.  However, none of the 
ratifying States have sought any exclusion based on Articles 4 or 5.81 Article 6 provides 
that the Convention “does not apply to work done by children and young persons in 
schools for general vocational or technical education or in other training instructions or to 
work done by persons at least 14 years of age in undertakings, where such work is carried 
out in accordance with conditions prescribed by the competent authority.”82   
Under Article 7(1) national laws may permit the employment of persons 13 to 15 
years of age on light work which is “(a) not likely to be harmful to their health or 
development; and (b) not such as to prejudice their attendance at school, their 
participation in vocational orientation or training programmes approved by the competent 
authority or their capacity to benefit from the instruction received.”83  It is up to the 
competent authority to determine which types of employment may be permitted, set the 
number of hours in which the young person may be employed and the conditions in 
                                                            
80 Id. art. (5)(1). Under Article 5(3) no exceptions will be allowed in the following areas: mining and 
quarrying; manufacturing; construction; electricity, gas and water; sanitary services; transport, storage and 
communications; and agricultural undertakings mainly producing for commercial purposes, but excluding 
family and small-scale producing for local consumption. A State seeking to exclude based on Article 5(1) 
must have first consulted with the employer and worker organization, listed the exclusions in a declaration 
appended to the instrument of ratification, and be subject to periodic reports explaining any progress which 
has been made towards wider application of the Convention. Article 5(2)-(4). 
81 Breen Creighton, Combating Child Labour: The Role of International Labour Standards, 18 Comp. Lab. 
L.J. 362, 375 (Spring 2006).  Creighton suggest that some States may have interpreted Articles 4 and 5 as 
restrictive rather than flexible thereby inhibiting these States from ratifying the Convention.  Id.  The 
International Labour Office appears to have recognized this possibility as evidenced from its suggestion to 
the ILO Governing Body that a memo be prepared describing Convention No. 138 so that States can better 
appreciate the flexibility of Article 4 and 5.  Id. (citing ILO , Child Labour: What Is To Be Done? (2005), 
para. 9). 
82 Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No. 138),  art. 6.   
83 Id. art. 7(1)(a)-(b).  A ratifying State may permit the employment of persons who are at least 15 years of 
age but have not completed their compulsory education on work which meets the requirements in Article 
1(a)-(b). Id. art. 7(2). 
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which such work may be undertaken.84  Ratifying States that have set fourteen as the 
minimum age under the provisions of Article 2(4) may substitute the ages 12 and 14 for 
the ages 13 and 15 in Article 7(1) and the age of 14 for the age 15 in Article 7(2).85  This 
Article seems to provide that employment under the age of 12 is not permitted under any 
circumstances and requires States to enact legislation relating to the amount and 
conditions under which light work may be undertaken by children.   
The Committee of Experts on the Application of Convention and 
Recommendation of Minimum Age No. 138 in their 1981 General Survey reported that 
“few nations have decided that light work should not be allowed for younger children.  
Therefore, most countries allow some work by children below the minimum age for 
admission to employment and have made little effort to regulate the amount or the 
conditions of such work.”86  The provisions of Article 7 may be the primary reason that 
so few developed countries have ratified Convention No. 138.87  Under Article 7, a 
twelve-year-old could not deliver newspapers, shovel snow, or wash cars after school or 
during vacations.  In order to comply with Article 7 ratifying nations would have to 
legislate an area of work which is temporary in nature.  It is highly questionable whether 
a developed country such as the United States, which already has comprehensive labor 
laws, would regulate this area where the potential for abuse is slight.   
 Article 9(1) provides that “all necessary measures, including the provision of 
appropriate penalties, shall be taken by the competent authority to ensure the effective 
                                                            
84 Id. art. 7(3).   
85 Id. art. 7(4). 
86 Creighton, supra note 81 at 378 (citing the General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Convention and Recommendations: Minimum Age, ILO, 67 Sess., Rep III, pt. 4B, at para. 
35 (1981)). 
87 For example the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada have not ratified Convention 
No. 138. 
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enforcement of the provisions of this Convention.”88  Furthermore, Article 9(2) further 
provides that “national laws or regulations or the competent authority shall define the 
persons responsible for compliance with the provisions giving effect to the 
Convention.”89  Moreover, Article 9(3) provides that “national laws or regulations or the 
competent authority shall prescribe the registers or other documents which shall be kept 
and made available by the employer, such registers or documents shall contain the names 
and ages or dates of birth, duly certified wherever possible, of persons whom he employs 
or who work for him and who are less than 18 years of age.”90   
Convention No. 138 was supplemented by the Minimum Age Recommendation, 
1973.  Recommendation No. 146 gives more detailed guidance regarding the minimum 
age (which States should seek to raise to 16 years) and in particular to conditions of work 
such as remuneration, hours of work, rest, social security and occupational safety and 
health.91   
2.  The Supervisory System of the ILO 
The ILO has the most-highly-developed system of any international governmental 
organization for the adoption and supervision of international standards.92  The ILO 
enforcement procedures fall into three main categories: submission and examination of 
annual reports, supervision based on the submission of complaints and representations, 
and technical cooperation programs to help member states comply with their ILO 
obligations.  
                                                            
88 Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No. 138), art. 9(1). 
89 Id. art. 9(2).  The Committee of Experts has interpreted “persons responsible” as those persons whom 
legal obligations are imposed.  Typically, this will be employers and in some circumstances will be parents. 
Creighton, note 83 at 382 (citing the General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Convention and Recommendations: Minimum Age, ILO, 67 Sess., Rep III, pt. 4B, at para. 35 (1981)).  
90 Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No. 138), art. 10(3). 
91 Minimum Age Recommendation, 1973, (No. 146).  Recommendation No. 146 can be found in its 
entirety at http://ilolex.ch:1567/public/50normes/ilolex.pqrecc. 
92 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 124. 
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The ILO system of supervision requires each member state to submit annual 
reports.93  After the Reports are submitted, the Committee of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations (the Committee) examines them.94  The 
Committee’s examination is based on the review of the required government reports 
submitted by member states, the laws and regulations adopted by the member state, and 
observations by employers' and workers’ organizations.95  The Committee is to be 
objective and impartial in pointing out the extent to which it appears that the situation in 
each State is in conformity with the terms of the Conventions.96  The Committee submits 
its annual report to the Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations.97  The Conference Committee, which holds its sessions in public, 
focuses on member states that have the greatest difficulties in meeting their ILO 
obligations.98  It invites the governments concerned to furnish explanations and answer 
questions concerning the report.99  The Conference Committee then summarizes its 
                                                            
93 ILO, Constitution of the International Labour Organization and Standing Orders of the International 
Labour Conference, art. 22 (1989).  Article 22 of the ILO Constitution requires member states “to make an 
annual report to the International Labor Office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the 
provisions of Conventions to which it is a party.” Id. 
94 Valticos & Potobsky, supra note 16 at 284. From a legal aspect, the Committee of Experts is the main 
supervisory body of the ILO.  The Committee is composed of 20 members who represent various regions 
of the world and serve in their personal capacities rather than as government representatives.  They are 
appointed for three-year renewable terms by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the ILO 
Director-General.  Appointments are based on technical qualifications.  See, id. at 284-285.        
95 Id. at 285. 
96 Id. at 283.  The Committee meets in closed sessions and its deliberations are in private.  The findings of 
the Committee take the form of either observations or requests.  Observations, published in a lengthy 
annual report, are used to draw attention to cases involving more serious or long-standing failures to 
comply with Convention obligations.  Requests are not published but are sent directly to the member state 
concerned and to employers’ and workers’ groups.  Id. at 286. 
97 Id.  
98 The Conference Committee is set up at the annual sessions of the International Labour Conference and is 
composed of representatives of governments and of employers’ and workers’ organization.  Id. at 286. 
99 Id. at 287. 
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conclusions in a report which is then sent to member states with instructions to address 
particular issues in their next report to the ILO.100    
Another procedure to supplement the regular reporting system is the direct 
contacts procedure.  This procedure is used at the request or with the cooperation of the 
government concerned when a state has persistently failed to comply with the ILO’s 
findings regarding their obligations under the Convention.101 
The ILO Constitution provides for two kinds of complaints that may set in motion 
contentious proceedings concerning the application of a ratified Convention: complaints 
and representations.  The complaint procedure is provided for under Article 26-34 of the 
Constitution.102  A complaint may be filed by a state that is a party to a Convention “if it 
is not satisfied that the other member is securing the effective observance of that 
Convention.”103  The ILO Governing Body may also initiate a complaint on its own or 
after receiving a complaint from a delegate to the International Labour Conference.104   
When a complaint has been filed, the Governing Body may appoint a 
Commission of Inquiry to make a thorough examination of the matter.105  When the 
Commission of Inquiry has fully examined the issue, it prepares a report embodying its 
findings on all questions of fact relevant to determining the issue, and containing 
recommendations as to the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint.106  After 
receiving the report, the implicated government is required to state within three months 
                                                            
100 Id. The Conference Committee has emphasized that it is not acting as a tribunal and that mentioning of a 
member state having difficulties with its Convention obligation is not to be construed as a sanction.  Id.  
101 Id. at 288. A “direct contact” involves ILO officials visiting the country to assess the situation more 
thoroughly and to aid in the provision of technical assistance 
102 ILO Constitution, supra note 93 art. 26-34. 
103 Id. art. 26 para. 1. 
104 Id. art. 26 para. 4. 
105 Id. art. 26 para. 3.  
106 Id. art. 28.  The Commission of Inquiry is composed of three independent persons, one of whom is 
appointed chairman by the Governing Body.  De la Cruz, at 96.  
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whether or not it “accepts the recommendations; and if not, whether it proposes to refer 
the complaint to the International Court of Justice.”107  The decision of the International 
Court of Justice is final.108  No country has ever appealed the findings of the Commission 
of Inquiry to the International Court of Justice.109   
If a country does not comply with the recommendations or conclusions of the 
Court within a defined period of time, the Governing Body may propose to the 
Conference the measures it considers necessary to secure compliance.110  The 
government may inform the Governing Body that it has taken the measures necessary to 
apply the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry or the Court’s decision, and 
may request that another Commission of Inquiry be convened to verify these 
assertions.111  If this report is favorable, the Governing Body will discontinue any 
additional compliance measures that it might have instituted.112  Finally, the Commission 
of Inquiry includes in its recommendations a request that the implicated state note in its 
annual reports to the ILO the steps that it has taken to give effect to the 
recommendation.113  
The second type of contentious procedure for by the ILO Constitution is that of 
representation.114  A representation may be made by any employer or worker 
organization on the ground that a State has “failed to secure in any respect the effective 
                                                            
107 Id. art. 29.  No court has ever appealed the Commission’s findings to the International Court of Justice.  
De law Cruz, supra 12 at 95. 
108 Id. art. 31.  The International Court of Justice may confirm, modify or annul the conclusions or 
recommendations.  
109 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 95. 
110 ILO Constitution, supra note 93 at art. 33.  Other measures to secure compliance have never been used.  
De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 95. 
111 Id. art. 34.   
112 Id. 
113 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 97. 
114 ILO, Constitution supra note 93 at art. 24-25.  
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observations of a Convention to which it is a party.”115  The Governing Body decides, on 
receiving a representation, whether to establish a Tripartite Committee composed of one 
government, one employer, and one worker representative from its members.116  The 
Committee gathers information on the matter and deliberates in closed meetings.117  After 
receiving the Committee’s report, the Governing Body deliberates in private on the 
representation.118  A representative from the implicated government may participate in 
the deliberations with the right to speak, but not to vote.119  The Governing Body can 
either accept the government’s explanation and terminate the proceeding, or “if no 
statement is received within a reasonable time from the government in question or if the 
statement when received is not deemed to be satisfactory by the Governing Body, the 
later shall have the right to publish the representation and the statement, if any, made in 
reply to it.”120  The publication of the case is the most serious decision the Governing 
Body can take to conclude the procedure.121 
Besides the supervisory system, the ILO provides member states with technical 
assistance to enable them to achieve greater compliance with its ILO obligations.122  
Specific activities may include technical assistance in drafting legislation, organizing 
regional seminars on standards, and providing technical and vocational education.123  
Technical assistance has never been withdrawn to punish states that refuse to implement 
                                                            
115 Id. at art. 24.  The organization does not have to be from the accused country. 
116 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 90.  No national of the State against which the representation has been filed, 
nor any person who is an official of the complainant organization, may be a member of this committee.  Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 91. 
119 Id. at 91. 
120 ILO Constitution, supra note 93 at art. 25. 
121 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 91.  The Governing Body has only taken this step once, deciding to publish 
a case in the Official Bulletin of the ILO.  Normally, the Governing Body decides that the government 
should continue to inform the ILO on the measures it has taken rectify the situation, within its regular 
supervisory methods.  Id. 
122 De la Cruz, supra note 12 at 86.   
123 Id. at 87. 
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labor standards.124  Rather technical assistance is seen as way of encouraging states to 
comply with ILO standards.  
The ILO relies on moral persuasion, publicity, shame, and diplomacy to ensure 
compliance by member states.125  No material form of sanctions has ever been 
implemented to induce compliance from a member state.126  In fact, none of the ILO’s 
supervisory procedures include sanctions against a country found in violation of an ILO 
standard.  If the ILO did implement sanctions against violating states, this may have the 
effect of discouraging member states from ratifying ILO Conventions and perhaps 
motivate member states to denounce Conventions to which they are already parties.127  
Over the years, the ILO has stepped-up its use of its contentious procedures.  
Since 1919, there has only been twenty-six complaints and forty-six representations 
submitted to the ILO.  However, twenty-eight of these were between 1983 and 1994.128  
While the overall low number of complaints and representations might be due to the 
effectiveness of the regular supervisory proceeding, the more likely explanation is the 
unwillingness of states to criticize each other for human rights violations.129  Because 
nations often view complaints as hostile acts, they may fear retaliation.  The overuse of 
contentious methods may create distrust among member states and threaten the entire 
ILO system.130 
                                                            
124 Id. at 85. 
125 J.M. Servis, Flexibility and Rigidity in International Labour Standards, 125 Int’l Lab. Rev. 193, 202-203 
(1986). 
126 Id. at 203. 
127 A ratifying state may denounce a out-right Convention of which it is party.  There have only been 72 
outright denunciations as against more than 6,000 ratifications.  Valticos & Potobsky supra note 16 at 274.  
128 Id. at 293-294. 
129 Virginia A. Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization, in the United 
Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal 580, 601 (Phillip Alston ed., 1992). 
130 Id. at 600. 
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3.  Enforcement of the Minimum Age Convention No. 138 
 The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations has published a number of individual observations and requests 
regarding non-compliance by particular member states with the Minimum Age 
Conventions of 1973 (No. 138).  The Committee has also addressed the two 
representations filed against member states regarding non-compliance with Convention 
No. 138. 
 The Committee has published five observations concerning non-compliance by 
Dominica with Convention No. 138.  In 1993, the Committee noted “with regret”131 that 
for the third straight year Dominica had not sent its required annual report on the status of 
its implementation of Convention No. 138.132  The Committee requested once again that 
a report would be sent during its next session.133  In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, the 
Committee noted that the national laws have not been amended to give effect to the 
minimum age for admission to employment, which was specified to be 15 years when the 
Convention was ratified by Dominica.134  Each year, the Committee repeated that it was 
“hopeful” that reports would be sent by the government of Dominica to the Committee.135   
                                                            
131 “The Committee is extremely polite in its comments and has developed a stylized and under stood 
diplomatic language to couch its remarks.  For, example phrases such as ‘with concern’ or ‘with regret’ are 
understood to denote harsh criticism and signify that the government’s failure to adhere to its Convention 
obligation are serious.  Leary, supra note 128 at 598.  
132 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 Dominica 
(ratification: 1983) Published: 1993.  
133 Id. 
134 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 Dominica 
(ratification: 1993) Published: 2004, February;  CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention 
No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 Dominica (ratification: 1993) Published: 1995, February; CEACR: 
Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 Dominica (ratification: 
1983) Published: 2005. CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 
1973 Dominica (ratification: 1993) Published: 2006. 
135 Id. 
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 In 2006, the Committee was active in publishing observations concerning the non-
compliance with Convention No. 138 by member states.136  For example, the Committee 
asked that Rwandan government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated to clarify 
the scope of the exceptions provided for in Article 7 of the Convention.137  A similar 
observation was published regarding Romania and Costa Rica.138    
 The Committee observed that France in application of Convention No. 138, 
intended to revise its Maritime Labour Code, which established a minimum age of 15 
years, in order to raise the minimum age for work on board ships to 16 years.139  The 
Committee requested the Government to indicate the measures which have been taken to 
bring its legislation in to conformity with the obligations deriving from the Convention 
on this point.140   
 In a case dealing with the Russian Federation, the Committee noted “with 
concern” the indication in the Government’s report that the minimum age for 
employment had been lowered to 15 from the previous 16, by virtue of Federation 
legislation.  The Committee observed that the lowering of the existing minimum age is 
                                                            
136 The Committee has published 12 observations on ratifying states in 2006.  See ILO web page at 
http:ilolex.ilo. 
137 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 Rwanda 
(ratification: 1981) Published: 2006.  Article 7 provides that exceptions to the minimum age for admission 
to employment in the case of light work done by children over 13 years of age on condition that the work is 
not likely to be harmful to their health or development and not such as the prejudice their school attendance.  
Convention No. 138, supra note 72, art. 7.  With the current situation in Rwanda it is hard to believe this is 
realistic. 
138 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 Romania 
(ratification: 1975) Published: 2006; CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, 
Minimum Age, 1973 Costa Rica (ratification: 1976) Published: 1993.   
139 CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 138, Minimum Age, 1973 France 
(ratification: 1990) Published: 2006. 
140 Id. 
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contrary to the principles of the Convention, which is to raise progressively the minimum 
age, provided in Articles 1 and 2(2).141   
 In an observation regarding Togo, the Committee requested the Government to 
indicate as provided by Article 2(3) of the Convention the measures which had been 
taken or are envisaged for the benefit of street children and children who are employed as 
domestic servants.142 
 Also, the Committee recalled in an observation on Uruguay that, at the time of 
ratifying Convention No. 138, Uruguay specified under Article 2(1) of the Convention 
the minimum age of 15.143  The Committee noted however that the Government indicated 
in its report submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, that 
the minimum age is 14 according to national legislation.144   The Committee urged 
Uruguay to clarify the situation, with particular reference to the legislative provisions 
actually in force on the matter.145 
 The Committee has reported on two representations type complaints regarding 
failure to comply with Convention No. 138 (along with various other ILO Conventions).  
The first representation was submitted in 1985 against Costa Rice by various Costa Rican 
worker organizations.146  The complainant organizations alleged that the Legislative 
Assembly had adopted legal measures that constituted violations of Convention No. 138, 
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without specifying the content of these measures or the provisions of the respective 
Conventions concerned.147  The Committee noted that, in the absence of more specific 
information on the part of the complainant organizations, it was impossible for it to reach 
any kind of conclusions casting doubt on the application to the Convention by Costa 
Rica.148  Thus, the representation, as far as it related to Convention No. 138 was 
dismissed. 
The second representation was submitted in 1987 by the Oil, Chemical, Atomic 
Workers International Union, and the AFL-CIO, alleging non-compliance by the Federal 
Republic of Germany with Convention No. 138 (along with a number of other ILO 
Conventions).149  The Committee did not consider the representation and the procedure 
was closed without explanation. 
4.  ILO Efforts and Convention No. 138 in Perspective 
 While it is impossible to expect a single international Convention to eliminate the 
use of child labor, Convention No. 138 is an important international instrument with 
which to combat child labor.  However, it is not a perfect.  The major problem is the lack 
of flexibility regarding the light work issue under Article 7 and 8.150  In some countries it 
is common practice for children younger than thirteen to work after school doing various 
odd jobs.  This type work is seen as often beneficial in teaching self-reliance and 
responsibility.151  Furthermore, this type of work is difficult to regulate.  One could argue 
that the lack of flexibility in the light work issue explains the unwillingness of developed 
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countries, such as the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, to ratify 
Convention No. 138.   
 Another problem with the Convention has been recognized by the ILO is that is 
does not set priorities for national action, but rather leaves this to the competent 
authorities in each country.152  The Convention does not “specify what priorities should 
be given to measures geared to preventing children from finding themselves in work 
situations that jeopardize their development or are contrary to human rights, to 
withdrawing immediately those who are already in such situations and to ensure that they 
do not return to such work.”153 
  The ILO in 1992 initiated the International Programme for the Elimination 
of Child Labour (IPEC).154  This program is designed to help member states to eliminate 
child labor by strengthening national capacities to address child labor problems.155  The 
program, by giving financial support to partner organizations to develop and implement 
measures which aim at preventing child labor, withdrawing children from hazardous 
work and providing alternatives, and improving the working conditions as a transitional 
measure towards the elimination of child labor.156  There are over 1,000 IPEC programs 
currently being implemented around the world.157   
 Despite the problems with Convention No. 138, member states should be 
encouraged to ratify it.  If nothing else it represents a gesture that the nation intends to 
address the problem of child labor.      
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C.  United Nation Efforts to Curb Child Labor 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains fifty-four articles, only one of 
which is directed specifically at child labor.158  Article 32(1) provides that “States Parties 
recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from 
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s 
education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or 
social development.”159  Furthermore, Article 32(2) “provides that States Parties shall 
take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure the 
implementation of the present article.  To this end, States Parties shall in particular: (a) 
Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment; (b) Provide 
for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment; (c) Provide for 
appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the, effective enforcement of the 
present article.”160  The Convention does not recommend a specific minimum age, which 
allows the parties a wide range of discretion in meeting this requirement.   
Article 44 of the Convention provides that “States Parties undertake to submit to 
the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the 
measure they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized therein and on the 
progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) within two years of the entry into 
force of the Convention for the State Party concerned, (b) thereafter every two years.”161  
Furthermore, Article 45 provides that agencies that monitor the child labor problem, 
UNICEF and other UN organs, report their suggestions and recommendations to the UN 
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General Assembly.162  This article would be triggered when a monitoring agency finds 
that a state is not fulfilling its Article 32 obligation.   
In January, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is in charge of 
monitoring the implementation of the Convention, issued conclusions and 
recommendations that relate to child labor regarding two countries.163  Regarding Libya, 
the Committee concluded that the Government should further research the situation of 
child labor, including conducting studies on the involvement of children in hazardous 
work. 164   Regarding the Federated States of Micronesia, the Committee expressed 
concern about the absence of laws regulating child labor and providing for a minimum 
age for employment.165  
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child is an important step in the process of 
protecting working children.  However, the Convention is only as effective as its 
implementation process.  Article 45 includes mechanisms which, if effectively employed, 
would allow for better enforcement of the Convention. 
D.  Unilateral Measures by the United States 
 The United States has several laws that seek to curtail child labor overseas.  These 
laws have a primarily economic thrust.  Their emphasis is on stopping unfair competition.  
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If companies that employ cheap child labor can undercut the costs of production of U.S. 
companies, then the products produced in those countries will enter the U.S. market 
priced lower than those manufactured here.  Thus, U.S. companies are at a disadvantage 
if other countries allow the use of child labor.   
 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),166 Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) Act,167 and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBERA),168 call for the beneficiaries of trade with the U.S. to adhere to internationally 
recognized workers’ rights.169  These rights include a minimum age requirement for the 
employment of children.170  The requirement is only that participating nations establish a 
minimum age; the law, does not provide requirements for that age. Once the conditions 
have been met and trade has begun, the Trade Act of 1974171 allows for retaliation for 
violations, including the suspension of trade or foreign aid payments.172   
There are several problems that impede the use of these measures to combat child 
labor.  The first problem is that while the GSP can effectively promote the rights of 
workers, it still only requires nations to establish a minimum age for employment.  
Because the CBERA and OPIC, also only require that nations establish a minimum age 
(nor necessarily enforce it), it is unlikely these provisions can be used to seriously impact 
the international problem of child labor.  
A second problem is that developing countries could unite and attempt to create 
new international worker rights.  For example, if mandatory health care were an 
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international worker right, the U.S. would be in violation of that right.  Nations could 
then refuse to trade with the United States until it implemented a plan for mandatory 
health care for workers.  If developing countries thought that the U.S. was imposing its 
values upon them, they could in retaliation seek to impose their own values on the U.S.  
How realistic is this scenario?  It is hard to say but it is worth noting that the U.S. is the 
only developed country that does not have some kind of universal health care for its 
citizens.  
In addition, to the U.S. trade legislation mentioned above, the U.S. Congress has 
considered legislation that more specifically seeks to curb child labor abroad.  A 
proposed Child Labor Deterrence Act (CLDA) first introduced by Senator Tom Harkin in 
1999173 and reworked every year until 2006, would call for a flat-out ban on the 
importation of goods made with child labor.174  The latest draft of the bill would require 
the Secretary of Labor to identify those countries whose industries make use of child 
labor, which is defined as labor performed by an individual under the age of fifteen 
(fourteen in those countries where the national law provides).175  The Secretary of Labor 
would publish in the Federal Register a list of countries that were in violation and would 
institute a ban on the importation of products from that country.176  Also, under the 2006 
draft CLDA, the bill would authorize the President to contribute $10 million to the ILO to 
help foreign countries better enforce their own child labor laws and alleviate widespread 
poverty that contributes to child labor.177   
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The bill has generated substantial controversy.  Some scholars believe that it 
might lead to an even worse situation for the very children it intends to help.178  The fear 
is that a sudden ban on imports made by child labor would throw working children out of 
their current jobs and into even more brutal working conditions.179  The primary support 
for this claim is the experience of the Bangladesh garment industry.  UNICEF reported 
that in 1993 the Bangladesh garment industry, fearful of the potential effect of passage of 
the CLDA, fired an estimated 50,000 child workers.180  Reportedly, many of those 
thrown out of work ended up in stone crushing jobs and hustling on the streets.181  As a 
partial remedy, UNICEF and the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association agreed in 1995 to remove all remaining children from their work rolls and to 
place children removed from the garment industry in appropriate educational 
programs.182  The mere possibility of passage of the CLDA seemed to have at least 
focused industry attention on the issue of child labor.  
Another controversial aspect of CLDA is that it violates the rules of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).183  
Under GATT Article XI, “no prohibitions or restrictions … whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export licenses, or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of 
any other contracting party.”184  The CLDA places an absolute prohibition on products 
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made by child labor and is therefore not within the GATT principles.  Under the rules of 
GATT/WTO, if the bill were passed, countries affected by the legislation could challenge 
it as a non-tariff trade barrier.  The U.S. would be forced to abandon the legislation 
altogether, or accept trade sanctions equivalent to the sales which countries lost in the 
U.S. due to the child labor import ban.  The only way the U.S. could avoid this dilemma 
would be to quit GATT and the WTO altogether. 
E.  Unilateral Measures: Other Countries’ Domestic Legislation 
 Almost all of the developing countries from which the United States imports 
products have some sort of domestic child labor laws.185 Most of these countries have a 
minimum age for employment of between fourteen and sixteen years.186  Child labor laws 
in developing countries have had little or no effect in stopping child labor.  The problem 
is that many countries grant numerous exceptions or are unable to enforce their laws 
effectively.  For many countries, they simply lack the resources and personnel to do the 
job.  This problem is exacerbated by societal acceptance of child labor, the employers’ 
self interest, and the developing country’s desire to compete globally.  
F.  Measures Taken By Non-Governmental Organization 
1.  Consumer Action 
Private citizens can take action to curb the problem of child labor.  Concerned 
citizens can obtain reports from various organizations, such as the National Labor 
Committee (NLC)187 and the Child Labor Coalition, 188 to find out which products are 
made by child labor and boycott the use of those products.  If enough citizens acted, the 
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industries, faced with a falling demand for their products, would either stop their 
utilization of child labor or be forced out of business.   
2.  Corporate Initiatives and Labeling Programs 
 As consumers have become more aware of the problem of child labor, 
corporations have responded by adopting codes of conduct for their overseas operations 
and participating in product labeling programs.189  Codes of conduct seek to ensure that 
goods which imported and sold are not made by child labor.  They seek to require the 
corporations to monitor the overseas production of the goods.  The Apparel Industry 
Code of Conduct has been adopted by 36 of the 42 major garment manufacturers, 
designers and retailers in the United States.190  An agreement between The Gap, an 
apparel retailer, and the NLC, grants human rights and religious groups the authority to 
inspect The Gap’s Salvadoran contractor responsible for making their clothes, and to 
ensure it upholds The Gap’s code of conduct.191  However, absent assurances from 
independent monitors and publicly available reports, consumers have no guarantee that 
codes are being followed.192   
 Another solution is labeling programs.  The Rugmark program is an international 
project which certifies that carpets are made without the use of child labor.193  
Independent monitors validate that carpet looms do not use child labor.  Carpets that are 
certified as not being made by child labor are stamped with a “smiley face”, and the small 
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additional charge for Rugmark-approved carpets is put into a fund to help children who 
might otherwise be making carpets pay for school.194 
Another program is the FoulBall campaign.  Initiated by a coalition of 
international trade unions and non-governmental labor rights organizations, the FoulBall 
program seeks to eliminate the use of child labor in the manufacturer of soccer balls.  The 
Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA), which places its stamp of 
approval on top-quality soccer balls, agreed to join the campaign, and now requires all of 
its licensees to adhere to an extensive labor code as a condition of using the FIFA 
label.195 
A beneficial aspect of the private actions consumer, corporations and non-
governmental organizations is that they are not the actions of states and therefore do not 
violate any international agreements.  However, while the actions by consumers and 
corporations may be help in curbing the use of child labor, they alone will not eliminate 
such a pervasive and complex problem.   
 
V.  Proposals for Elimination of Child Labor 
 
 Advocates for children’s rights in the ILO, UNICEF, and in various non-
governmental organizations are divided as to the best strategy to address the problems of 
child labor.  Many advocates recommend abolishing all child labor immediately; they 
argue that in the long run, developing countries would benefit both economically and 
socially from a public policy of strict enforcement of both compulsory education and 
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minimum age laws.196  Other advocates for children’s rights believe that the immediate 
abolition of all child labor is unrealistic and, in many cases, contrary to the interests of 
the children themselves.197  This group is probably the majority and includes the ILO.198  
They recommend first abolishing the most abusive forms of child labor, and to allow 
individual governments to regulate the other forms.199  This group argues that child labor 
cannot be abolished until the underlying causes of the problem no longer exist.200   
Of the two strategies, the phase-out approach is clearly the more realistic.  
Measures adopted to end child labor should concentrate on the most abusive forms of 
child labor, such as slavery, child prostitution, bonded labor, and mining, and then move 
on the less dangerous forms.201  This approach is likely to be the most effective in the 
long run.  There are a number of measures that can be taken by the international 
community to assist in the phase-out strategy to eliminate child labor.  
A.  Measures by the ILO and the United Nations 
 The ILO is preparing a new Convention on the most intolerable forms of child 
labor.202   
The Convention will be debated in Geneva in October 2007 , for adoption in 2008.203  
The proposed Convention is principally targeted at two types of child labor.  First, “forms 
of labor that are contrary to fundamental human rights such as work performed by a child 
in slavery, debt bondage, or bonded labor; child prostitution; or the use of children in 
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drug-trafficking or in pornography.”204  Second, “work which, because of its nature or the 
conditions in which it is usually performed, exposes children to particularly grave 
hazards to their safety or health or prevents them from attending school normally.”205  
Ratifying states would be obliged to take immediate action to ensure the withdrawal of 
children from such work, and to protect them from the risk or returning to it in the 
future.206  While the new Convention is to address primarily intolerable forms of child 
labor, a proposed Article would require states to “commit themselves to formulating and 
implementing a national policy aimed at gradually eliminating other forms of child 
labor.”207 
 Along with the adoption of this new Convention, the ILO should continue to 
encourage member states to ratify Convention No. 138. A country that ratifies 
Convention No. 138 is undertaking its intention to eliminate child labor within its borders.  
While Convention No. 138 is not a perfect instrument to combat child labor, it is the best 
instrument at present.   
The ILO should continue its recent trend of publishing more observations on 
member states that are failing to comply with their ILO obligations under Convention No. 
138.  In so doing, the ILO will beam its spotlight on countries that consistently fail to 
comply, which will hopefully shame them into stricter compliance.  
 The United Nations has done a great job of getting nations to ratify the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  With almost universal acceptance, it is indeed an 
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impressive document.208  However, the UN could do more in the away of using its 
enforcement mechanism to ensure adherence to the Articles of the Convention.   
B.  Proposed Unilateral Measures 
 The U.S. could also increase trade sanctions through stronger legislation against 
the importation of goods produced by child labor.  However, the problem of such 
legislation violating GATT/WTO remains.  The enactment of child labor legislation 
would potentially subject the U.S. to sanctions from its trading partners. 
 Overall, it is best to stay away from the use of unilateral measures.  Other 
countries often see these actions as attempts by the United States to interfere in another 
country’s sovereignty.   
The United States under the recently signed GATT/WTO treaty is in a position to 
negotiate side agreements with countries to ensure recognition of worker’s rights, 
including those of children.209 
C.  Comprehensive Educational Action 
 Education is clearly one of the most important keys to combating child labor.210   
The establishment of compulsory education is a critical step to curbing child labor.  
Without compulsory education governments are unable to enforce child labor laws.  If the 
school-leaving age is lower than the age of admission to employment, children are likely 
to illegally seek employment, making the enforcement of child labor laws more 
difficult.211  It is worth noting that no country has successfully ended child labor without 
first making education compulsory and enforcing these laws.212   
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 Furthermore, in many countries there are not enough schools.213  This gives 
children not in school too much free time, free time that is often filled by working.  
Under these conditions, it is easy to recognize why parents would rather their children 
work than to run the streets with nothing to do.   
Some indicators of the extent of child labor in countries where national surveys 
were conducted recently 
 
Source: ILO Bureau of Statistics (Geneva, 1997 
The fewer the schools the greater the inconvenience for many children to even get to 
school.  Without school nearby, parents may prefer that their child works rather than 
travel far away for school.214 
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Finally, the imposition of school fees in some countries inhibits school 
attendance.215  For families that cannot afford to send their children to school, child labor 
becomes an alternative.  Countries should follow the example set by Sri Lanka which, 
with a ninety percent literacy level, provides free education up to the university level and 
also pays for school supplies, meals and uniforms.216  
Governmental and non-governmental organization can assist developing countries 
combat the problems of child labor by providing aid through donations or loans that will 
then allow those countries to build more schools and to reduce the costs of obtaining an 
education.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, child labor is a serious and complex problem.  There are no simple 
solutions.  But, the international community can play a part in curbing the problem of 
child labor.  The ILO and the UN should continue to encourage nations to ratify the 
present and future Conventions that address the issue, and also provide aid to help those 
countries already parties to the various convention to comply with their obligations to 
combat child labor.  Furthermore, corporations and private citizens can take action to 
reduce the use of child labor through boycotts, the adoption of labor codes, and 
participating in labeling programs.  While the problem is complex, the efforts of the 
international community have led to some improvements.  
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Global trends in child labor by form of work and year (million) 
 
Source: Source: Frank Hagemann, et al. Global child labour trends 2000 to 2004, International Labour Office 
 
Nevertheless, there remain further measures that can be taken by the international world 
to curb and eventually eradicate child labor.  
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